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The growing presence of foreign-owned financial institutions during the 1990s is one of the most striking structural changes in the financial systems of the countries in transition. Currently, on average 60 per cent of the total number of banks is in foreign hands. In some Central Eastern European (CEE), South Eastern European (SEE) and Baltic countries, the share of foreign bank assets relative to total assets of the banking system is even more than 75% (Bol et al., 2002) . This 'takeover' has occurred within a period of less than ten years. Given the high and growing share of foreign bank ownership, there is a growing need for studies on the reasons for foreign bank entry in transition economies. The existing literature on foreign bank entry mainly deals with Western European countries, or with the US (Buch, 2000) . There are only a few studies focusing on transition economies, but they only consider one country, or a small group of countries (e.g. Galac and Kraft, 2000, for Croatia, and Konopielko, 1999 , for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland).
In this paper we examine the reasons for foreign bank entry in transition economies. The goal of this paper is to test whether reforms and political freedom in a group of transition economies have positively contributed to foreign bank entry. We also examine via which channels reforms affect foreign bank entry. In our view, these issues are of utmost importance for policymakers in transition economies who are aiming to attract foreign banks. It may seem obvious that reforms have an important effect on foreign bank entry. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical papers available that have explicitly addressed this issue. We find strong evidence for the importance of reforms for foreign bank entry. Also political freedom seems to be important, although in some of the regressions political freedom does not significantly affect foreign bank entry. Moreover, the estimates suggest that reforms affect foreign bank entry by enhancing the efficiency of the financial sector, by changing the structure of the financial sector, and by stimulating domestic investments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the literature on determinants of foreign bank entry. Section 3 discusses the data set. Section 4 contains the estimation results for the determinants of foreign bank entry. Section 5 concludes. /LWHUDWXUH UHYLHZ
7KHRU\ RQ GHWHUPLQDQWV RI IRUHLJQ EDQN HQWU\
Why do banks go abroad? There is no unambiguous theory to explain foreign bank entry.
Nevertheless, several reasons are put forward in the literature (Buch, 2000 , Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2000 , Konopielko, 1999 . The main reason for foreign bank entry seems to be the 'follow the customer' principle, otherwise called the defensive expansion hypothesis (Williams, 2002) .
According to this view, a bank follows its customer's abroad to support its already existing relationship in the new country. A second reason why a bank might go abroad is because of the attractiveness of the host market. The market of the host country offers new opportunities to make money. The literature comes up with some other reasons as well, but they have not been mentioned in the context of transition economies. For instance, imitation of competitors, i.e. a multinational bank opens a branch in a specific country because another multinational did likewise. A reduction of the (capital) costs is another reason: internalisation gives a bank the opportunity to perform arbitrage. Moreover a multinational bank has access to worldwide capital sources. Finally, foreign banks may decide to go abroad in order to diversify financial risks (Canals, 1997) .
Another approach, that partly includes the five reasons mentioned above, to explain foreign bank entry is based on the eclectic paradigm, introduced by Dunning (e.g., Dunning, 2001) . Within this paradigm, advantages of foreign bank entry are based on three different theories. These are 1) RZQHUVKLSVSHFLILF advantages, based on the comparative advantages of the foreign bank; 2) ORFDWLRQ advantages and 3) incentives related to LQWHUQDOL]DWLRQ Ownershipspecific advantages refer to e.g. access to the endowments of the parent company at costs below market price, management skills, image, and existing bank-client relations. Location advantages are, for example, barriers to trade, institutional arrangements, and the financial situation of the host country. The incentives related to LQWHUQDOL]DWLRQ are advantages of multinational enterprises derived from the possibility of limiting the costs of market failures by carrying out a share of their transactions within the boundaries of the firm.
(PSLULFV RQ GHWHUPLQDQWV IRUHLJQ EDQN HQWU\
It is not so easy to test the various theoretical arguments for foreign bank entry outlined in the previous section. Several determinants have been suggested in the literature (e.g. Buch, 2000, Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2000) 2 . One set of suggested determinants relate to the performance of a domestic financial sector, measured by indicators such as the return on equity, the net interest margin, overhead costs, and after tax income. To be expected is a positive relation between foreign bank entry and a good performance of the domestic banking sector. Other examples are:
the size of the financial system of the host country (total assets, private credit, central bank assets, concentration ratio), again a positive relation can be expected; information costs (distance from home country, common language, legal system, country risk, culture); regulations (degree of freedom in banking), and the presence of an international financial centre. Finally, several macro economic indicators are also used to proxy the attractiveness of the host country (GDP, population, FDI, investment rate, export of host country).
A potential problem with many of these variables is that the causality may go in the other direction. For instance, more foreign bank entry may enhance the overall efficiency of the banking sector. There is quite some evidence for transition countries that foreign banks are, on average, more efficient than domestic banks (see Bol et al., 2002) . Likewise, as foreign banks are more oriented towards the private sector than domestic banks, foreign bank entry may affect the level of domestic investment (Bol et al., 2002) . Another problem with some of the variables is that is not always clear which hypothesis they proxy. For instance, does a positive relation between FDI and foreign bank entry support the 'follow the customer' argument, or does it reflect the attractiveness of the new market? (Galac and Kraft, 2000 , Hoskova and Vagnerova, 1998 , Konopielko 1999 .
Other studies use macro data (Konopielko 1999, Mathieson and Roldos, 2001 Reasons for coming and staying:
Following existing clients/ doing business with home country clients.
Activities: Focused on large companies.
The table suggests that the main motive of foreign banks to become active in Central and Eastern European countries is the perceived need to support the client base, 'following the existing clients' (Konopielko, 1999, Galac and Kraft, 2000) .
However, these conclusions cannot be generalized since the existing empirical literature concentrates on only a few transition countries: Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. Furthermore, most literature is rather ad hoc, both in terms of theory (i.e. the model specification) and in terms of methodology. Moreover, it is remarkable that none of the papers has addressed the importance of political freedom and economic reforms. Transition economies are in a process from a communist plan economy to a democratic market economy. The degree to which this has taken place, i.e. the level of political freedom and economic reforms, are probably important considerations for foreign banks to enter one of these countries. For instance, countries that successfully established safe, transparent and enforceable rules for financial markets are probably attractive for foreign banks. Moreover, foreign ownership requires privatization. In addition, the removal of entry barriers, memberships of WTO and enterprises operating according to western 'standards' with respect to financial structure, corporate control etc., makes the market more attractive for foreign banks.
'DWD
A main problem with respect to research on foreign banking for transition economies is that many important variables are lacking. This holds also for our study, to some extent.
Nevertheless, we succeeded in developing a relatively comprehensive data set. By approaching Central Banks in transition countries and by using the existing data published by the IMF, Worldbank and the EBRD in their country reports we were able to come up with a relatively sophisticated database. It contains indicators for the development of the countries in general and the financial sector in particular. Moreover, it provides information on the structure and performance of the financial system. This paper uses a selection of variables from this database. 3 For a complete list of data sources and variable definitions, see the Appendix.
The set of countries include Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. The selection of these countries is mainly based on data availability for our foreign bank entry variable. The data refer to the 1992-2000 period. Since the years for which data are available differ per country, the estimates are done for an unbalanced panel. For all variables in the estimates we take the logarithm to better account for possible heteroskedasticity problems.
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The database distinguishes two indicators for foreign bank entry. The first indicator is the ratio between the total value of assets of foreign 4 deposit money 5 banks divided by the value of assets of all banks (9)25%. The second indicator is the total number of foreign banks divided by the total number of banks (1)25%. From both indicators we take the logarithm (/)25% and /1)25%, respectively), and construct an overall indicator for foreign bank entry by performing a principal components analysis on /9)25% and /1)25% The principal components analysis strongly suggests that there is one dominant factor (the proportion of the total variance explained by one component equals 0.97). The factor loading are 0.48 for /1)25% and 0.875 for /9)25%. Since the resulting foreign bank entry indicator ()%$1.) is highly correlated with both /1)25% and /9)25% (correlation coefficients of 0.996 and 0.956 with /V)25% and /1)25%, respectively) and since /9)25% and /1)25%
are also highly correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.924) we only present regressions in which )%$1. is the dependent variable (see section 4). In our data set we have six indicators that may pick up the relevance of reforms and political Table 3 . In the econometric analysis we control for different groups of variables that are traditionally mentioned to be important for foreign bank entrance. To start with, the literature suggests that the size and efficiency of the financial sector probably is an important pull factor for foreign banks. For this reason, we try to construct a variable that measures the development of the financial sector. Our data set includes seven indicators that may have something to do with financial sector development. These variables are: 1) private credit by deposit money bank assets over GDP (35,9$7& 2) deposit money bank assets over GDP (%$1.*'3 3) Deposit money bank assets over the sum of central bank assets and deposit money bank assets (%$1.727$/ 4) the M2 to GDP ratio 0*'3; 5) stock market capitalization in percentages of GDP (0$5.(7&; 6) the interest rate spread (635($' lending minus deposit rate), and 7) the rate of inflation (,1)/ Again we use a factor analysis to see whether there are some common underlying factors. This analysis shows that the seven "financial sector" indicators can be decomposed into three underlying factors. A closer look at the factorloadings for the three factors (see Table 5 ) shows that the first factor primarily has to do with the size of the financial sector (),16,=( For this factor, especially the financial size indicators /%$1.*'3 /35,9$7& and /0*'3 are important. The second factor is very much determined by 635($'. This factor therefore reflects the efficiency of the financial sector. Note that an increase in 635($' corresponds to a decrease in the efficiency of the financial sector. The third factor is the most difficult too explain. Especially market capitalization is important. This factor seems to primarily reflect the importance of the stock market. However, since also /%$1.727$/ dealing with the relevance of deposit money, is important, we interpret this factor as being related to the structure of the financial sector ),1675). Note: see note Table 4 We also control for variables that are traditionally considered to be important indicators for "follow the customer" and "attractiveness of the market" reasons. However, it is difficult to clearly distinguish between a group of variables that primarily deals with "follow the customer" and "attractiveness of the market" reasons. Moreover, these variables may be highly correlated with each other. For these reasons we selected 7 variables often mentioned to be important, and use a factor analysis to see whether these variables can be grouped in terms of "follow the customer" or "attractiveness of the market" considerations. The variables that we use are: 1) GDP per capita (*'33&); 2) the investment to GDP ratio (,19(67) ; 3) the size of the population (323) ; 4) the ratio of foreign direct investments over GDP ()',*'3); 5) the imports to GDP ratio (,03*'3) ; 6) tariff revenues as a percentage of imports (7$5,))) and 7) the trade to GDP ratio (75$'(). The factor analysis on the logarithms of these variables shows that a decomposition in three factors can be made. Table   6 shows the factorloadings for these factors. The first factor has high factor loadings for /75$' ( /,03*'3 and /7$5,) ). This suggests that the first factor mainly has to do with the openness of a country (23(1). Since the factor loading for /323 is also very high, but with a negative sign, there appears to be a strong correlation between the openness of a country and the size of the population: countries with a small population are more open. The second factor mainly has to do with the investment rate (,19(67) . The logarithm of GDP per capita has a very high factor loading on the third factor. This seems to imply that Factor 3 mainly deals with wealth (:($/7+). It is somewhat difficult to explain that /)',*'3 and /7$5,)) have high factorloadings on factor 3. Apparently, the richer countries among the group of transition economies we consider are more extensive users of import tariffs, and because of the import restrictions, are less attractive for foreign investors. Note that traditional "follow the customer" variables like /)',*'3 and /,03*'3 do not score high on the same underlying factor. This questions, to some extent, the relevance of the usual distinction between "follow the customer" reasons and "attractiveness of the market" reasons for explaining foreign bank entry. Table 7 This suggests that reforms probably affect foreign bank entry via the efficiency of the financial sector, the structure of the financial sector, and the amount of domestic investments.
7DEOH )DFWRUORDGLQJV IRU ),16,=( ),1()) DQG ),1675 )$&725 ),16,=( )$&725 ),1()) )$&725 ),1675

7DEOH )DFWRUORDGLQJV IRU
In the next section, we will explicitly test this.
7DEOH &RUUHODWLRQ 0DWUL[
) %$1. 32/,7,& 5()250 ,19(67 ) The high correlation between various variables as reported in table 7, does not make it possible to include all constructed explanatory variables in one regression. Therefore, the estimated equations are specified as follows:
where F L is a country specific constant for country i. i = (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia); and Π is an error term. Because of the high correlation between 5()250 and ),1()) ), 1675 and ,19(67, the latter variables are - for the time being -not included in the equation for foreign bank entry to avoid multicollinearity problems. As we will argue below, it seems likely that foreign bank entry will affect the efficiency and the structure of the financial system and domestic investment, which may explain the high correlation between these variables and )%$1. reported in Table   7 . Because of high multicollinearity between ), 16,=( and :($/7+ see We start by considering the relevance of the overall indicators for reforms and political freedom in attracting foreign banks. Table 8 for the wealth of a country (:($/7+) is included. This is probably due to the high collinearity between these two variables.
The regressions so far deal with "reduced form" effects of reforms on foreign bank entry. Ultimately it is important to know via which channels reforms may attract foreign banks. We make a first attempt to shed some more light on this issue by examining whether reforms affect foreign bank entry by improving the efficiency of the financial sector, by affecting the structure of the financial sector or by affecting domestic investments. The choice for these channels is suggested by the high correlation coefficient between ),1()) ),1675
and ,19(67, on the one hand, and 5()250 on the other (see Table 7 ). 
